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Abstract
I construct a micro-model to show that a currency crisis can spread from
one country to another even when these countries are unrelated in terms of eco-
nomic fundamentals and there is no capital linkage across countries through
a common lender or an interbank market. The key to explaining contagious
currency crises in the model lies in each speculator’s private information and
learning behavior about other speculators’ type. Since the payoﬀ of each spec-
ulator depends on other speculators’ behavior determined by their types, each
speculator’s behavior depends on her belief about other speculators’ types. If
a currency crisis in one country reveals the speculators’ types to some degree,
it leads to an updating of each speculator’s belief about other speculators’
types and therefore a change in her optimal behavior, which in turn can cause
a currency crisis even in another unrelated country without capital linkage.
Although the presence of contagion itself is not new in the literature, there
is an important implication diﬀerence between the literature and this paper.
The model shows that the crisis with better economic fundamentals can be
more contagious than that with worse economic fundamentals; this has not
been shown in the literature. This is because the former conveys information
about types of speculators while the latter does not. Even if country B does
not suﬀer from a contagious crisis due to bad economic fundamentals from
country A, it does not necessarily mean that it will never suﬀer contagion
from some other country with better economic fundamentals than country A.
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11 Introduction
The last decade has witnessed many contagious ﬁnancial crises. They begin locally,
in some region, country, or institution, and subsequently spread elsewhere. Example
of these include the Mexican Tequila eﬀect in 1994, the Asian Flu in 1997, the
Russian Virus in 1998, the Brazilian Sneeze in 1999, and so on.
Following these detrimental events, recent international policy issues have re-
volved around questions on how to stop, mitigate, or prevent contagion.1 In order
to answer these questions, it is important to clarify and pin down possible channels
through which a ﬁnancial crisis spreads from one country to another. This necessity
has stimulated a signiﬁcant body of research on possible channels of contagion. The
literature is growing and our understanding is becoming better, but it is still unclear
why a ﬁnancial crisis in one country spreads to another even when these countries
appear to be unrelated in terms of economic fundamentals.2 As an example, in the
aftermath of the 1998 devaluation of the Russian ruble, the Brazilian stock market
fell by over 50% and the sovereign spreads of Brazil rose sharply even though Russia
and Brazil are considered to be countries that do not share correlated fundamen-
tal shocks. Could this be just a coincidence? To the best of my knowledge, all
the empirical papers argue that it is not.3 The empirical literature agrees that the
Brazilian stock market was indeed negatively aﬀected by the Russian Virus. But it
is not clear why the Russian Virus hit Brazil. Russia and Brazil have virtually no
direct trade links; the two countries do not export similar goods which compete on
third markets; they are hardly similar in terms of either economic situation or eco-
nomic structure, and they have few direct ﬁnancial links. These facts raise several
important questions. Can contagion occur across countries that do not have any
trade linkage and are not similar?4
In the literature, only one channel of contagion across seemingly unrelated coun-
tries, without any direct or indirect trade linkage, has been explored so far: capital
linkage across countries (or regions) through a common lender and/or an interbank
market.5 The logic of capital linkage as the contagion channel is the following. If
1It is important to note that there is no universally accepted deﬁnition of contagion. Here I
mean by contagion the negative inﬂuence of the crisis on other countries’ ﬁnancial variables such
as the exchange rate, the stock index, sovereign spreads, and so on. I will give the deﬁnition of it in
Section 2 in much more precise way. See Forbes and Rigobon (2000, 2002) for a further discussion
of the deﬁnition of contagion.
2The term economic fundamentals is sometimes ambiguous. Here I follow the common usage
of the term in the literature of contagion: economic fundamentals are said to be related if there is
either trade linkage or some similarity across countries.
3For example, see Baig and Goldfajn (2000), Goldfajn (2000), Van Rijckeghem and Weder
(2001) and Forbes (2003).
4If they trade each other, there is direct trade linkage. If they compete in trades through a
third market, there is indirect trade linkage. I mean both by trade linkage.
5For theoretical explanations of contagion due to portfolio re-balancing, see Calvo (1999) and
Calvo and Mendoza (2000a, 2000b). For theoretical explanations of contagion due to the interbank
market or other relations among banks, see Backus, Foresi, and Wu (1999), Aghion, Bolton,
and Dewatripont (2000) Allen and Gale (2000), Dasgupta (2001), and Giannetti (2003). For an
2the currency crisis occurs in a country, international investors and/or international
banks would incur losses. Facing losses due to the crisis, they may pull out their
money or call in their loans to re-balance their portfolio or meet the capital ratio
requirement, not only from the originating crisis country but also from seemingly
unrelated countries. As a result, their withdrawal may cause contagion. From the
viewpoint of unrelated countries, they share international investors and/or interna-
tional banks with the originating crisis country as the common lender. That is why
this hypothesis is referred as the hypothesis of the common lender. Moreover, if the
common lender incurs huge losses or goes bankrupt due to the crisis, this negative
eﬀect can spread to other investors or banks through the interbank market, which
in turn can amplify contagion.
Although the logic of capital linkage is quite reasonable, unfortunately the em-
pirical evidences are mixed.6 This is because such capital linkage can be not only the
contagion channel but also a buﬀer against contagion. For example, suppose that
the international bank, as the common lender, has accumulated plenty of loan loss
reserves prior to the currency crisis. If the currency crisis in one country is not so
signiﬁcant for the international bank in that it can be dealt just within the existing
loan loss reserves, the international bank does not need to call in loans from other
countries to oﬀset the loss of the currency crisis. Therefore, the negative eﬀect of
the crisis will not be transmitted to other countries by the international bank with
enough loan loss reserves. Moreover, if the international bank provides liquidity to
countries in the turmoil of crisis, it is the buﬀer against the negative shock of the
crisis rather than the contagion channel. In fact, Baig and Goldfajn (2000) and
Goldfajn (2000) point out that German banks, which had huge exposure to Russia
and were badly aﬀected by the Russian Virus, had a rollover rate far above the
average in Brazil because they had set aside higher provisions for bad loans than
other banks.7 This means that Germen banks, as the common lender, worked as
the buﬀer in the turmoil of the Russian Virus, compared with other banks. So they
conclude that the hypothesis of the common lender as the contagion channel does
not ﬁnd support from the data during the Russian Virus.8 By the same token, if
the interbank market functions well, again it will be the buﬀer against the negative
shock of the crisis by channelling liquidity to ﬁnancial institutions in need of it.
excellent survey of various contagion channels, see Forbes (2003).
6Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) argue that there is an evidence in favor of the common
lender eﬀect in the Russian Virus.
7It is noteworthy that German banks received a large number of guarantees on their Russian
loans from the state-supported export-guarantee agency Hermes, which may have lessened their
losses compared to other banks. Thus not only the provision of German banks for bad loans but
also the guarantee might help German banks serve as the buﬀer against contagion.
8Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) exclude German banks from the sample in their estimation
because of the reason stated in footnote 7. They do not report whether or not there remains
the evidence in favor of the common lender eﬀect, even after introducing German banks in the
sample. Moreover, they report in another paper (Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2000)), which
excludes German banks from the sample as in Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), that they do
not ﬁnd the evidence in favor of the common lender eﬀect in the Russian Virus when they use
more disaggregated data of bank ﬂows than in Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001).
3Indeed, Furﬁne (2002) argues the federal funds market performed well during the
Russian Virus to mitigate liquidity shortage of ﬁnancial institutions.9 These papers
suggest that capital linkage is not a panacea to explain contagion across unrelated
countries and there may be another contagion channel that has not yet been found.
Thus it is still worthwhile to explore possible channels of contagion across unrelated
countries.
This paper aims at complementing the growing literature by proposing a new
channel of contagion. I show that the currency crisis can be contagious across
unrelated countries even when there is no capital linkage among them. I consider a
situation where economic fundamentals of countries are unrelated and there is no
capital linkage through the common lender or the interbank market. None of the
contagion channels in the literature work in this situation.
Needless to say, the contagion channels, including the one proposed in this paper,
can be complementary. In other words, they can work at the same time in the
contagious crisis. Therefore the contagious eﬀect of the crisis will be ampliﬁed if
several channels work simultaneously. The result of this paper then suggests that
the contagious eﬀect can be larger than the existing literature would anticipate.
There are two common aspects in the literature in considering contagious cur-
rency crisis: the extent of the negative shock of the crisis and who is hurt by it. The
reasoning behind much of this literature can be classiﬁed into one of the following
two categories. First, if economic fundamentals are related across countries, the
negative shock of the crisis in one country will hurt related countries directly, re-
sulting in contagion. Second, if economic fundamentals are not related, the negative
shock will hurt the common lender who in turn causes contagion across unrelated
countries. This paper departs from these two common aspects, which enables us
to ﬁnd a new channel of contagion: the channel arises because of each speculator’s
private information and learning behavior about other speculators’ types. Since the
payoﬀ of each speculator depends on other speculators’ behavior in relation to their
type, the optimal behavior of each speculator depends on her belief about other
speculators’ types. If the currency crisis in one country reveals speculators’ types to
some degree, it will lead her to update her beliefs and thereby change her optimal
behavior, which in turn leads to contagion. In this channel, the negative shock per
se does not matter for contagion and no speculator is hurt.10 Therefore, this channel
can work even when economic fundamentals of each country are independent, there
is no capital linkage across countries, and no speculator is negatively aﬀected by
the crisis.
While the existence of contagion itself is not new in the literature, there is an
important implication diﬀerence of contagion between the literature and this paper.
The implication of the literature is that the crisis with worse economic fundamen-
tals will be more contagious than that with better economic fundamentals. But this
9Thus we need to interpret the ﬁnding of Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) with caution,
besides the reason in footnote 8. This is because they do not take into account the possible role of
the interbank market as the buﬀer against contagion.
10As will be shown in the model, speculators do not lose money but earn proﬁts in crises.
4model shows that the crisis with better economic fundamentals can be more conta-
gious than that with worse economic fundamentals. The literature implies that if
country B does not suﬀer from a contagious crisis due to bad economic fundamen-
tals from country A, then it will never suﬀer contagion from some other country
with better economic fundamentals than country A. This is because the literature
relies on the relationship of economic fundamentals or the common lender to explain
contagion. The worse economic fundamentals in country A are, the more severely
the related countries or the common lender is hurt. Thus the worse economic fun-
damentals in country A are, the more contagious the crisis in country A becomes.
But according to the ﬁndings of this paper, the opposite could be true. This is
because the crisis in country A with better economic fundamentals will convey more
information regarding the types of speculators. If economic fundamentals are quite
bad, the currency crisis will occur for sure irrespective of the type of speculators. So
the currency crisis does not convey any information of the type. Therefore, nobody
would update her belief about others’ type. But if the currency crisis happens in the
country whose economic fundamentals are considered to be good, it reveals the type
of speculators to some degree. This is because the crisis would happen in this case if
and only if speculators are of a certain type. Therefore, the crisis makes speculators
update their belief about others’ type and thereby change the behavior, which can
lead to contagion. It implies that even if country B could get rid of the contagion of
the crisis, it does not necessarily mean that it will not be vulnerable to contagion of
crises that happens in the country with better economic fundamentals. This seems
counterintuitive, but it is reasonable in fact. If the currency crisis happens in the
country whose economic fundamentals are good, everybody will be surprised, which
can make the crisis more contagious.
In the theoretical literature of currency crises, the closest papers to this paper
are Morris and Shin (1998) and Metz (2002). They show how to derive the unique
equilibrium in the models of currency crises where there are multiple equilibria.
However, these papers are not concerned with the problem of contagion whereas the
issue of contagion is central to this one.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is described. In
Section 3, the empirical implications are considered. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
There are two countries, country A and country B. The government of each country
pegs the currency at some level. The economy in each country is characterized by a
state of underlying economic fundamentals, µj (j = A;B). A high value of µj refers
to good fundamentals while a low values refers to bad fundamentals. I assume µj
is randomly drawn from the real line, with each realization equally likely. Also,
there is no linkage of economic fundamentals between country A and country B: µA
and µB are independent. That is, there is no direct trade or ﬁnancial linkage, no
indirect trade linkage through a third market, or no indirect capital linkage through
5Success Failure
Attack D ¡ t ¡ ¹1 ¡t ¡ ¹1
Not Attack 0 0
Table 1: Payoﬀ Matrix
a common lender or an interbank market.
There are two groups of speculators, group 1 and group 2. 11 Both groups
consist of a continuum of small speculators, so that an individual speculator’s stake
is negligible as a proportion of the whole. I index the set of speculators by the unit
interval [0;1]. There are two possible types of Group 1 with respect to aggressiveness:
one type is the “bull” with probability q while another type is the “chicken” with
probability 1 ¡ q. That is, all the speculators in group 2 are bull (chicken) with
probability q (1 ¡ q). I assume group 1’s type is their private information. Group
1’s type is always bull and is public information, which is just for simplicity. The
size of group 1 is ¸ while that of group 2 is 1 ¡ ¸, where 0 · ¸ · 1.
Receiving the possibly noisy private signal about economic fundamentals, a spec-
ulator decides whether to short-sell the currency, i.e., attack the currency peg, or
not. I envisage the short-selling as consisting of borrowing the domestic currency
and selling it for dollars. If the attack is successful (i.e., the peg is abandoned), she
gets a ﬁxed payoﬀ D (> 0). Attacking the currency, however, also leads to a cost
t + ¹1 (> 0). The cost t can be viewed largely as consisting of the interest rate
diﬀerential between the domestic currency and dollars, plus the transaction cost. If
a speculator refrains from attacking the currency, she is not exposed to any cost
but she does not gain anything either. (See Table 1.) ¹1 captures a diﬀerence of
aggressiveness between the bull and the chicken, as speciﬁed below. To make the
model interesting, I assume that successful attack is proﬁtable for any speculator.
Assumption 1 D ¡ t ¡ ¹1 > 0.
I assume that the government defends the currency peg if the cost of this action
is not too high. The cost of defending the peg depends on two factors: the propor-
tion of speculators attacking the currency peg of country j, lj, and the economic
fundamentals of country j, µj. I assume the cost is increasing in lj and decreasing
in µj. The intuition behind this is as follows. If, for instance, speculative pressure
is very high (i.e, lj is so large), the government may need to increase interest rates
quite sharply in order to defend the peg, which will be detrimental to the country.
Thus the cost of defending is increasing in lj. But if economic fundamentals are
good, the government may have plenty of foreign reserves to defend the peg so that
it may not have to raise the interest rates. It means the negative eﬀect of defending
11Here I construct a model as the speculators game in order to make the new contagion channel
at work as clear as possible: I exclude any other channels from the model. But the new channel can
be embedded easily into other frameworks such as the common lender models. See the Appendix.
6the peg on the country will be relatively mild. Therefore the cost of defending is
decreasing in µj. More speciﬁcally, I assume the net cost of defending the peg is
lj ¡ µj. The government’s optimization is as follows.
Assumption 2 (Government’s Optimization) The government defends the peg
if lj ¡ µj < 0. It abandons the peg if lj ¡ µj ¸ 0.
In what follows, I call crisis if the government abandons the peg and no crisis
if the government defends the peg.
As regards speculators’ preferences, the expected utility of attacking the currency
of the country is the following.
U =
(
Prob[Attack is successful]D ¡ t ¡ ¹1 if a speculator is the chicken
Prob[Attack is successful]D ¡ t if a speculator is the bull
Since attacking the currency may fail depending on the government’s action or
other speculators’ action (i.e., it will fail if lj ¡ µj < 0), it is a riskier action than
not-attacking. Thus assume the chicken speculator speculator feels some disutility
when she takes the risky action. The term ¹1(¸ 0) captures the disutility.
On the other hand, it is safe to refrain from attacking the currency in that the
payoﬀ is surely zero irrespective of the government’s action or other speculators’
action. Therefore, the utility of not attacking the currency is zero both for the
chicken speculator and the bull speculator.
As will be shown, it is critical in this paper that the private signal of economic
fundamentals is noisy to speculators, in deriving the unique equilibrium. The in-
tuition behind the noisy private information is that the relevant information in
deciding whether or not to attack is not always accurate. Sometimes the informa-
tion may have measurement error simply. Sometimes the government may announce
the wrong information intentionally, trying to discourage speculators to attack.12 It
in turn implies that there is some room for small discrepancies among speculators
as to how the information is interpreted. In reality, it is also common that each
speculator does not know exactly either which information other speculators have
or how they interpret the information. This means that the signal is private at least
to some degree. The noisy private signal in the model captures the above idea. Let
xji be the speculator i’s private signal about economic fundamentals about country
j. I assume the property of xji as follows.
Assumption 3 (Noisy Private Signal)
When the true state is µj, a speculator i observes a signal xji which is drawn uni-
formly from the interval [µj ¡ ²;µj + ²], for some small ². Conditional on µj, the
signals are identical and independent across individuals.
12For example, the Bank of Korea announced that its international reserves were more than $30
billion in face of the Thai Baht collapse in the 1997 Asian currency crisis. The announcement
was intended to restore foreigners’ conﬁdence about Korean economy. But it turned out that the
actual reserves the Bank of Korea could use in the crisis were considerably less than its announced
oﬃcial reserves. See ?).
7Assumption 3 states the following. The signal is private and noisy if ² > 0 and
the noise is uniformly distributed. The noise in the private signal is independent
of µj and across speculators. Moreover, the noise in the signal of country A is
independent of the noise in the signal of country B.
The timing of the game among governments and speculators is structured as
follows.
² Period 1
– Nature chooses each value of µA and µB independently, as well as the type
of group 1. Group 1 is chosen to be the bull with probability q or the
chicken with probability 1¡q (0 < q < 1). The value of µj is known to the
government of country j. Group 1 ’s type is known to every speculator
in group 1, but it is not known to any speculator in group 2.
– Each speculator receives a private signal xAi = µA + ²Ai.
– Each speculator decides whether to attack the currency of country A or
not individually.
– The government of country A abandons the peg if and only if lA¡µA ¸ 0.
It defends the peg otherwise.
– Both the aggregate outcome in country A and the value of µA are known
to every speculators. If the attack is successful, those who attacked get
D ¡ t ¡ ¹1. If the attack is not successful, their payoﬀ is ¡t ¡ ¹1. The
payoﬀ of those who did not attack is zero irrespective of the result of
attack.
² Period 2
– Each speculator receives a private signal xBi = µB + ²Bi.
– Each speculator decides whether to attack the currency of country B or
not individually.
– The government of country B abandons the peg if and only if lB¡µB ¸ 0.
It defends the peg otherwise.
– Both the aggregate outcome in country B and the value of µB are known
to every speculators. If the attack is successful, those who attacked get
D ¡ t ¡ ¹1. If the attack is not successful, their payoﬀ is ¡t ¡ ¹1. The
payoﬀ of those who did not attack is zero irrespective of the result of
attack. (See Figure 1)
For simplicity, I assume ¹1 is some positive constant ¹ if a speculator is the
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Figure 1: Timing of the Game
From Assumptions 2 and 4, the expected utility of attacking the currency can
be rewritten as follows.
U =
(
Prob[lj ¸ µj]D ¡ t ¡ ¹ if a speculator is the chicken
Prob[lj ¸ µj]D ¡ t if a speculator is the bull
In sum, the information structure of the model in period 1 is the following.in
period 1 13 The government of country j knows the value of µj. Any speculator in
group 1 knows his own type, the type of speculators in group 2 (¹1 = 0 for any
speculator in group 2), the government’s optimization rule and his own private sig-
nal. Group 1’s type is private information. Each speculator in group 2 knows her
own type, the probability that group 1 is chicken (bull) q (1 ¡ q), the government’s
optimization rule and her own private signal. In order to derive the model’s equi-
librium, it is crucial to correctly deﬁne which elements of the game are common
knowledge in period 1. These are the payoﬀ D, the cost t, the value of ¹1 (¹ or
0), the distribution of the noise and its parameter ², the probability that group 1 is
chicken, the type of speculators in group 2 and the government’s optimization rule.
The value of µj is common knowledge if and only if ² = 0. The intuition behind the
assumption that group 1’s type is private information is the following. Assume that
group 1 consists of oﬀshore funds registered in so-called tax heavens and therefore
regulation on them is less stringent than that of industrialized countries. Since in-
formation about such oﬀshore funds is not typically open to the public, it is hard to
ﬁgure out how much risk they can take. Therefore, some uncertainty exists about
group 1’s attitude for risk. That is why group 1’s type is private information.
In Subsection 2.1, I show that there are multiple equilibria with self-fulﬁlling
beliefs in the case ² = 0 where the economic fundamentals are common knowledge.
In Subsection 2.2, I show that we can obtain the unique equilibrium in the case ² > 0
where the economic fundamentals are not common knowledge. Also, I show that a
13I will argue in Subsection 2.2 that the information structure may change in period 2, depending

























Figure 2: Outcome conditional on µ and l
currency crisis in country A can spread to country B through the new channel of
contagion: the learning of speculators about others’ type.
2.1 Multiple Equilibria
First assume ² = 0. In this case, µj becomes common knowledge because everyone
receives the same signal. This is a situation where each speculator knows exactly
what everyone else knows in deciding whether or not to attack the currency. It is
similar to the situation investigated by Obstfeld (1986, 1996). Here I show there are
multiple equilibria ` a la Obstfeld under certain conditions.
Clearly, the currency peg is stable if µj > 1. This is because the net cost of
defending the peg is always negative irrespective of the speculators’ actions. Thus
the government always defends the peg. On the other hand, the peg is unstable
if µj · 0, since the government always abandon the peg regardless of speculators’
actions. If 0 < µj · 1, the peg is said to be ripe for attack. In this region, the gov-
ernment is forced to abandon the peg if a suﬃcient proportion of speculators attacks
the currency, whereas the peg will be kept if a suﬃcient proportion of speculators
chooses not to attack. (See Figure 2) Therefore we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Multiple Equilibria)
(i) If µj > 1, the unique equilibrium is that no speculator attacks and the currency
peg is sustained (No-Crisis Equilibrium).
(ii) If µj · 0, the unique equilibrium is that every speculator attacks and the cur-
rency peg is abandoned (Crisis Equilibrium).
(iii) If 0 < µj · 1, there are two possible equilibria: No-Crisis Equilibrium and
Crisis Equilibrium.
The speculators will attack the currency only if they believe in success and
will refrain from attacking otherwise. Thus in any of the equilibria, their actions
10vindicate the initial beliefs. In other words, the equilibria have the self-fulﬁlling
property.
In the ripe-for-attack region, we naturally come up with an important question.
Out of two possible equilibria, which will indeed arise? How is one equilibrium
selected over another? The typical approach in the literature is just to assume
that it is determined by sunspot. In this approach, the important question is in
eﬀect unanswered since sunspot itself is given exogenously. More importantly from
my perspective, this approach is silent on the issue of contagion because there is
no equilibrium selection mechanism in the multiple equilibria model. I show in the
next subsection that we can obtain the unique equilibrium even in the ripe-for-attack
region, by relaxing the assumption of common knowledge of economic fundamentals
(i.e., ² > 0).
2.2 Unique Equilibrium
In Subsection 2.1, I have derived multiple equilibria. The multiplicity is due to
strategic complementarities among speculators. In general, it is quite common that
there are multiple equilibria in models of strategic complementarities. A major
drawback of these multiple equilibria models is the ambiguity of possible outcomes,
as the sole prediction to be made is that there exists a range of fundamentals for
which a crisis is possible but does not have to occur necessarily. Because of the
self-fulﬁlling property of the equilibrium, beliefs of speculators will determine the
outcome. But beliefs themselves are indeterminate within the models. Consequently,
it is hard to generate comparative statistics and therefore policy alternatives can
hardly be derived.
Carlson and van Damme (1993) are the ﬁrst to show that the indeterminacy
of beliefs in multiple equilibria models is an artifact of the simplifying common
knowledge assumption. This assumption is meant only to simplify the analysis
in the literature but in fact delivers more than intended; non-common knowledge
can generate a unique equilibrium in such class of models under certain conditions.
Morris and Shin (1998) applies it to derive the unique equilibrium in the multiple
equilibria model of currency crises ` a la Obstfeld (1986, 1996).14 I follow Morris and
Shin’s approach. One of the contributions of this paper is to show a new contagion
channel whereas their papers are not concerned with contagion. In the new channel,
it is critical that economic fundamentals are not common knowledge, there are two
possible types of speculators, the type of group 1 is not common knowledge in period
1, and each type behaves diﬀerently in period 1 under certain circumstance. The
diﬀerent behavior contingent on the type may reveal their type to some degree and
14As regards other applications of non-common knowledge to obtain the unique equilibrium in
various settings that have multiple equilibria under common knowledge, see an important series
of works by Morris and Shin (1999, 2000, ?, 2001, 2002, 2003a, 2003b). However, non-common
knowledge is not a panacea to obtain the unique equilibrium. There can be multiple equilibria
under certain conditions even when we assume non-common knowledge. See Metz (2002), Chan
and Chiu (2002) and Morris and Shin (2003b).
11thereby speculators in group 2 update beliefs about the type of group 1. It in turn
leads to a change in the behavior of speculators in group 2 in period 2, resulting in
contagion across unrelated countries without any common lender.
Now assume ² > 0. In this case, µj is no longer common knowledge because
the signal about µj is noisy and private.15 This is a much more realistic situation
where each speculator does not know exactly what everyone else knows in deciding
whether or not to attack, as opposed to in the situation of the previous subsection.
Following Morris and Shin (1998) and Metz (2002), I concentrate on the switching
strategy equilibrium. The switching strategy equilibrium consists of the following
values conditional on the choice of nature and the information structure: a unique
value of the economic fundamentals ˜ µj up to which the government always abandons
the peg, and a unique value of the private signal conditional on the type of spec-
ulators ˜ xji (¹1), such that every speculator who receives signal lower than ˜ xji (¹1)
attacks the currency peg.
The general intuition behind this equilibrium is the following: conditional on
the information structure, there is a unique switching fundamental value of ˜ µj be-
low which the government always abandons the currency peg. The unique value ˜ µj
generates a distribution of private signals, such that there is exactly one switching
signal ˜ xji (¹1), for each type respectively, below which the speculator always attack
the currency. The switching signal ˜ xji (¹1) would make a speculator receiving it in-
diﬀerent between attacking and not-attacking. If all speculators with signals smaller
than ˜ xji (¹1) decide to attack, the distribution of private signals, generated by ˜ µj,
would in turn generate a proportion lj = ˜ µj of attackers that will be suﬃcient to
force a devaluation of the currency peg.
Let YA = If˜ µA ¸ µAg where If²g is the indicator function whose value is unity
if the argument is true and zero otherwise. Thus YA = 1 if and only if the currency
crisis happens in country A. Using ˜ µj and YA, I deﬁne contagion as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 There is contagion if and only if ˜ µB(YA = 1) > ˜ µB(YA = 0).
Deﬁnition 1 captures contagion precisely, in that it can distinguish contagion
of crises from just a coincidence of crises. To see this, ﬁrst pick any µB such that
˜ µB(YA = 0) < µB < ˜ µB(YA = 1). Given such µB, the currency crisis happens in coun-
try B if and only if the crisis happens in country A. This is exactly contagion. Next,
pick any µB such that µB < ˜ µB(YA = 0). In this case, the currency crisis happens
in country irrespective of the occurrence of the crisis in country A. Therefore, it is
just a coincidence in the latter case if the currency crises happen in both countries.
I derive the unique equilibrium in this two-period game in the following way.
First I derive the unique equilibrium in the one-shot game in each period separately.
Next I show that the unique equilibrium for both periods is indeed the subgame-
perfect equilibrium in the two-period game.16
15In the context of industry investment, Caplin and Leahy (1994) explore a model to explain the
timing of market crashes in which the private noisy signal plays the key role, while they are not
concerned with contagion.
16Morris and Shin (1999) show that if there is the unique value of ˜ x(¹1), then the switching
122.2.1 The Equilibrium in Country A
The equilibrium values ˜ µj and ˜ xji (¹1) belong to two situations of indiﬀerence: for
µj = ˜ µj the government is indiﬀerent between defending the peg and abandoning
it, whereas speculators with ¹1 receiving a private signal ˜ xji (¹1) are indiﬀerent
between attacking the peg and refraining from doing so. I consider the symmetric
switching strategy equilibrium in which every speculator of the same type uses the
same switching value: ˜ xji (¹1) = ˜ xj (¹1). Thus in what follows, I omit the subscript
i.
After receiving the private signal, each speculator has to decide whether to attack
the peg, which leads to costs of t + ¹1 and an uncertain payoﬀ of D, or not to
attack the peg which is associated with a net proﬁt of zero with certainty. The
switching signal, ˜ xA (¹1), makes each speculator of type ¹j indiﬀerent between these
two choices. For indiﬀerence it is thus required that:
Prob[Attack is successful j ˜ xA (¹1)]D ¡ t ¡ ¹1 = 0 (1)
The government will abandon the peg if µ is smaller than or equal to ˜ µA, so that the
probability of a successful attack equals the probability that the realized value of µ
is smaller than or equal to ˜ µA, given ˜ xA (¹1). As will be shown, ˜ µA takes diﬀerent
values depending on whether speculators in group 1 are the bull or the chicken. So
denote ˜ µA (¹1) ´ ˜ µ¤
A if speculators in group 1 are bull (i.e., ¹1 = 0) and ˜ µA (¹1) ´ ˜ µ¤¤
A
if speculators in group 1 are chicken (i.e., ¹1 = ¹).
First, consider the behavior of speculators in group 1. They know their own type
and the type of speculators in group 2, so that they know which value of ˜ µA (¹1),
˜ µ¤
A or ˜ µ¤¤
A , would appear in the equilibrium. Noting xA = µA +²A and ²A » U[¡²;²],
(1) can be rewritten as follows.
t + ¹1 = Prob
h
































strategy with ˜ x(¹1) is the only equilibrium strategy that survives the iterated deletion of dominated
strategy, i.e., there cannot be any other form of the equilibrium strategy. They prove it in the one-
shot game where there is only one type of speculators. I am working to check whether it holds in
the two-stage game of this paper where there are two types of speculators, but I have not completed
yet. It is an interesting topic for future research.
13Here the subscript of ˜ xA1 stands for country A and group 1. In the symmetric
equilibrium, every speculator in group 1 uses the same switching private signal.
From (2), the switching signals ˜ x¤
A1 ´ ˜ xA1 (¹1 = 0) and ˜ x¤¤
A1 ´ ˜ xA1 (¹1 = ¹) have to
satisfy the following.
˜ x¤





















Second, consider the behavior of speculators in group 2. They know their own
type, but they do not know the type of speculators in group 1. Hence they do not
know which value of ˜ µA (¹1) would appear in the equilibrium. Let q be their belief
that speculators in group 1 are bull. (1) can be rewritten as follows.
t = Prob[Attack is successful j ˜ xA2]D
= Prob[Attack is successful when ¹1 = 0 j ˜ xA2]D
+ Prob[Attack is successful when ¹1 = ²¹ j ˜ xA2]D
= q £ Prob
h




D + (1 ¡ q) £ Prob
h
µA · ˜ µ
¤¤
A j ˜ xA2
i
D
= q £ Prob
h





+ (1 ¡ q) £ Prob
h
˜ xA2 ¡ ²A · ˜ µ
¤¤
A j ˜ xA2
i
D
= q £ Prob
h
˜ xA2 ¡ ˜ µ
¤
A · ²Aj ˜ xA2
i
D
+ (1 ¡ q) £ Prob
h
˜ xA2 ¡ ˜ µ
¤¤
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Therefore, conditional on q , ˜ xA2 has to satisfy the following.
˜ xA2 ¡ q ˜ µ¤







Third, consider the behavior of the government. The government is indiﬀerent
between defending the currency peg and abandoning it, if the proportion of specu-
lators attacking the peg lA = µA. The proportion of attacking speculators is equal
to the proportion of speculators who get a private signal smaller than or equal to
˜ xAj (¹1) (j = 1;2). However, notice that ²A is assumed to be independent of the
true value of µA, there is a continuum of speculators in group 1 and group 2, the
14size of group 1 is ¸, and the size of group 2 is 1 ¡ ¸. This means that this propor-
tion corresponds to the weighted average of the probability with which one single
speculator in group 1 observes a signal smaller than or equal to ˜ xA1 (¹1) and the
probability with which one single speculator in group 2 observes a signal smaller
than or equal to ˜ xA2. Thus the proportion of attacking speculators conditional on
µA is the following.
lA (µA) = ¸Prob[xA1 · ˜ xA1 (¹1)j µA] + (1 ¡ ¸)Prob[xA2 · ˜ xA2j µA]
= ¸Prob[µA ¡ ²A · ˜ xA1 (¹1)j µA] + (1 ¡ ¸)Prob[µA ¡ ²A · ˜ xA2j µA]
= ¸
˜ xA1 (¹1) ¡ µA
2²
+ (1 ¡ ¸)
˜ xA2 ¡ µA
2²
(7)
In RHS of the ﬁrst line, the ﬁrst term is the proportion of attacking speculators in
group 1 while the second term is the proportion of attacking speculators in group
2. From (7) and the deﬁnition of ˜ µA (¹1), we get the following.





˜ xA1 (¹1) ¡ ˜ µA (¹1)
2²
+ (1 ¡ ¸)
˜ xA2 ¡ ˜ µA (¹1)
2²
Therefore, ˜ µ¤
A and ˜ µ¤¤
A can be described as follows.
˜ µ
¤
A ´ ˜ µA (¹1 = 0) = ¸
˜ x¤
A1 ¡ ˜ µ¤
A
2²
+ (1 ¡ ¸)






A ´ ˜ µA (¹1 = ¹) = ¸
˜ x¤¤
A1 ¡ ˜ µ¤¤
A
2²
+ (1 ¡ ¸)




There are ﬁve equations, (3), (4), (6), (8), and (9) and there are ﬁve unknowns,
˜ x¤
A1, ˜ x¤¤
A1, ˜ xA2, ˜ µ¤
A and ˜ µ¤¤
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By construction, switching private signals makes each speculator in each group indif-
ferent between attacking the currency peg and refraining from doing so respectively,
conditional on ˜ µ¤
A and ˜ µ¤¤
A . To show that these values indeed consist of the switch-
ing strategy equilibrium, it needs to be veriﬁed that every speculator in each group
strictly prefers to attack (refrain from) the currency peg given any private signal less
than (greater than) the switching private signals conditional on ˜ µ¤
A and ˜ µ¤¤
A . In order
to verify this, it is suﬃcient to check if an individual speculator in each group ﬁnds
it optimal to follow the switching strategy provided that every other speculator fol-
lows the switching strategy. So suppose every other speculator follows the switching
strategy. Then an individual speculator in each group takes ˜ µ¤
A and ˜ µ¤¤
A as given.
From (2) and (5), the expected utility of attacking the currency peg is strictly de-
creasing in the private signal given ˜ µ¤
A and ˜ µ¤¤
A . This is because the probability that
an attack is successful is strictly decreasing in the private signal given ˜ µ¤
A and ˜ µ¤¤
A .17
Therefore, for any private signal less than (greater than) the switching signal, the
expected utility of attacking the currency peg is strictly greater than (smaller than)
that of refraining from doing so. Thus it is optimal for any speculator to follow
the switching strategy provided that everyone else follows the switching strategy.
Moreover, it can be shown that ˜ µ¤
A > ˜ µ¤¤
A . Intuitively speaking, the bull speculators
are more likely to attack than the chicken speculators for any given private signal.
It means the bull speculators are more likely attack for any given economic funda-
mentals, which in turn implies that the currency peg is more likely to be abandoned
if speculators in group 1 are bull. That is why ˜ µ¤
A > ˜ µ¤¤
A . Proposition 2 summarizes
the above argument.
Proposition 2 (Unique Equilibrium in Country A)
Conditional on the type of speculators in group 1, the unique switching strategy
equilibrium in country A consists of the switching private signal ˜ xA (¹1) and the
switching economic fundamentals ˜ µA (¹1) as follows.
(i) Suppose speculators in group 1 are bull (¹1 = 0) and their type is private
information.
(a) Every speculator in group 1 attacks the currency peg if and only if she
observes the private signal less than or equal to ˜ x¤
A1.
(b) Every speculator in group 2 attacks the currency peg if and only if she
observes the private signal less than or equal to ˜ xA2.
(c) The government of country A abandons the currency peg if and only if
economic fundamentals are less than or equal to ˜ µ¤
A.
17The greater the private signal is, the more likely everyone else receives the greater signal also.
It means the proportion of attacking speculators is likely to be small because everyone else is more
likely to refrain from attacking the peg. So the probability that an attack is successful becomes
smaller.
16(ii) Suppose speculators in group 1 are chicken (¹1 = ¹) and their type is private
information.
(a) Every speculator in group 1 attacks the currency peg if and only if she
observes the private signal less than or equal to ˜ x¤¤
A1.
(b) Every speculator in group 2 attacks the currency peg if and only if she
observes the private signal less than or equal to ˜ xA2.
(c) The government of country A abandons the currency peg if and only if
economic fundamentals are less than or equal to ˜ µ¤¤
A .




2.2.2 The Equilibrium in Country B
In period 2, every speculator observes not only what has happened in country A but
also the exact value of µA. These observations convey information about the type
of speculators in group 1 if speculators in group 1 follow the strategy described in
Proposition 2. The strategy in Proposition 2 is the Nash equilibrium strategy in the
one-shot game, so that it is not obvious whether speculators in group 1 follow it in the
two-stage game or not. First, I analyze the switching strategy equilibrium in country
B assuming speculators in group 1 follow the strategy described in Proposition 2 and
then summarize the results in Proposition 3. Next, I will prove that Proposition 2
and Proposition 3 describe the subgame perfect equilibrium in the two-stage game.
Assume speculators in group 1 follow the strategy described in Proposition 2.
There are two possible cases of µA that is critical to the information structure in
period 2. First, pick any µA = 2 [˜ µ¤¤
A ; ˜ µ¤
A]. For any µA · ˜ µ¤¤
A , the currency crisis
will occur in country A for sure, irrespective of the type of speculators in group
1. For any µA ¸ ˜ µ¤
A, the currency crisis will never occur in country A irrespective
of the type of speculators in group 1. Therefore, the type of speculators in group
1 will never be revealed for any µA = 2 [˜ µ¤¤
A ; ˜ µ¤
A]. It means that there is no essential
change in the information structure in period 2. Second, pick any µA 2 [˜ µ¤¤
A ; ˜ µ¤
A].
Conditional on such µA, the currency crisis happens in country A if and only if
speculators in group 1 are bull. In other words, whether or not the currency crisis
happens in country A for such µA; the type of speculators in group 1 is revealed. If
the currency crisis has occurred in country A for such µA, speculators in group 2
know that speculators in group 1 are bull. If the currency crisis has not occurred
in country A for such µA, speculators in group 2 know that speculators in group
1 are chicken. In each case, the type of speculators in group 1 becomes common
knowledge in period 2. So it changes the information structure of the game in
period 2 critically. Thus, speculators in group 2 update their belief of the type of
group 1 and thereby they change the optimal behavior. Therefore, even though
economic fundamentals are totally unrelated across country A and country B, what
has happened in country A aﬀects the optimal behavior of speculators, which in
17turn aﬀects what would happen in country B. This is exactly the key to explaining
contagion across unrelated countries without any common lender.
Now we can ﬁnd the switching strategy equilibrium in country B, which is con-
ditional both on what has happened in country A and on the value of µA. Since
there is no essential change in the information structure for any µA = 2 [˜ µ¤¤
A ; ˜ µ¤
A], the
switching strategy equilibrium in country B is exactly same as the one in country
A in Proposition 2. In other words, the switching strategy equilibrium in coun-
try B is described just by replacing the subscript A with B in Proposition 2 for
any µA = 2 [˜ µ¤¤
A ; ˜ µ¤
A]. How about the switching strategy equilibrium in country B for
µA 2 [˜ µ¤¤
A ; ˜ µ¤
A]? There are two possible cases. One is that the currency crisis has
happened in country A while another is that the currency crisis has not happened
in country A. In the former case, speculators in group 2 learns that speculators in
group 1 are bull. Let us call this Case 1. In the latter case, speculators in group
2 learns that speculators in group 1 are chicken. Let us call this Case 2. First, I
analyze the switching strategy equilibrium in country B in Case 1. Next, I analyze
the switching strategy equilibrium in country B in Case 2.
In Case 1, every speculator is bull and this fact is common knowledge. It means
every speculator is identical so that all the speculator will use the same switching
signal, x¤
B. Thus the proportion of attacking speculators conditional on µB is the
following.
lB (µB) = Prob[xB · x
¤
Bj µB]








Since the government is indiﬀerent between defending the peg and abandoning it
when µ¤
B = lB, we get the switching economic fundamentals µ¤
B from (15) as follows.
µ
¤








Observing the switching private signal x¤
B, the expected utility of attacking the
currency peg must be zero.
t = Prob[Attack is successful j x
¤
B]D







































18It can be shown that (18) and (19) consist of the switching strategy equilibrium
exactly same as in Proposition 2.
In Case 2, it is common knowledge that speculators in group 1 are chicken and
speculators in group 2 are bull. Denote the switching signal of a speculator in group
1 by x¤¤
B1, that of a speculator in group 2 by x¤¤
B2 respectively. The proportion of
attacking speculators conditional on µB is the following.
lB (µB) = ¸Prob[xB1 · x
¤¤
B1j µB] + (1 ¡ ¸)Prob[xB2 · x
¤¤
B2j µB]
= ¸Prob[µB + ²B · x
¤¤












Since the government is indiﬀerent between defending the peg and abandoning it
when µ¤¤
B = lB, we get the switching economic fundamentals µ¤¤
B from (20) as follows.
µ
¤¤

















Observing the switching private signal x¤¤
B1, the expected utility of attacking the
currency peg for the chicken speculator must be zero.
t + ¹ = Prob[Attack is successful j x
¤¤
B1]D





















Similarly, observing the switching private signal x¤¤
B2, the expected utility of at-
tacking the currency peg for the bull speculator must be zero. Since the type of
speculators in group 1 is common knowledge, speculators in group 2 do not need to
take an expectation over µ¤
B and µ¤¤
B in their expected utility. They actually know
that µ¤¤
B would arise as the switching economic fundamentals. Thus the expected
utility conditional on x¤¤
B2 can be written as follows.
t = Prob[Attack is successful j x
¤¤
B2]D


























































19It can be shown that (24), (25) and (26) consist of the switching strategy equilibrium
exactly same as in Proposition 2. Proposition 3 summarizes the above argument.
Proposition 3 (Unique Equilibrium in Country B)
Suppose speculators follow the strategy in Proposition 2. Conditional on µA and what
has happened in country A, the unique switching strategy equilibrium in country B
consists of the switching private signals and the switching economic fundamentals
as follows.
(i) For any µA 62 [˜ µ¤¤
A ; ˜ µ¤
A], the unique switching strategy equilibrium in country B
replicates the one in country A exactly: every speculator and the government
follow the exactly same switching strategy as in Proposition 2.
(ii) If the currency crisis has happened for µA 2 [˜ µ¤¤
A ; ˜ µ¤
A] in country A, it becomes
common knowledge that speculators in group 1 are bull.
(a) Every speculator in each group attacks the currency peg if and only if she
observes the private signal less than or equal to x¤
B.
(b) The government of country B abandons the currency peg if and only if
economic fundamentals are less than or equal to µ¤
B.
(iii) If the currency crisis has not happened for µA 2 [˜ µ¤¤
A ; ˜ µ¤
A] in country A, it
becomes common knowledge that speculators in group 1 are chicken.
(a) Every speculator in group 1 attacks the currency peg if and only if she
observes the private signal less than or equal to x¤¤
B1.
(b) Every speculator in group 2 attacks the currency peg if and only if she
observes the private signal less than or equal to x¤¤
B2.
(c) The government of country B abandons the currency peg if and only if
economic fundamentals are less than or equal to µ¤¤
B .
2.2.3 The Sub-Game Perfect Equilibrium in the Two-Stage Game
So far I have investigated the equilibrium in the one-shot game. In particular, I have
derived Proposition 3 assuming that Proposition 2 holds not only in the one-shot
game but also in the two-stage game. But it is not obvious whether Proposition 2
holds in the two-stage game or not. In other words, it may not be the case that the
sequence of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 is the sub-game perfect equilibrium.
Here I prove this is indeed the case.
First, note that the sequence of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 is at least a Nash
equilibrium, if not the sub-game perfect equilibrium. If everyone follows the strategy
in Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 in the two-stage game, no one has an incentive
to change the behavior. This is because any individual speculator cannot change
the switching economic fundamentals by herself alone so it does not pay to deviate.
Second, notice that if speculators in group 2 believe speculators in group 1 are bull,
20it is more likely for the currency peg to be abandoned. So the chicken speculators
may have an incentive to make speculators in group 2 believe that group 1 were
bull. In order for chicken speculators to deceive, they need to behave in country A
as if they were bull by using the switching private signal of bull speculator, ˜ x¤
A1. In
that case, the switching economic fundamentals in country A would be ˜ µ¤
A as long
as all the chicken speculators use ˜ x¤
A1. Then for µA · ˜ µ¤
A, the currency crisis would
happen in country A. So the expected utility of the deceiving chicken speculator
conditional on ˜ x¤
A1 is the following.
Prob[Attack is successful j ˜ x
¤









D ¡ t ¡ ¹
= ¡¹ (27)
The second equality is because ˜ x¤
A makes the bull speculator indiﬀerent between
attacking the peg and refraining from doing so, i.e., 1 ¡ t=D ¡ (˜ x¤
A ¡ ˜ µ¤
A)=2² =
0. Thus ¹ can be thought of as the cost of deceiving. Next suppose the chicken
speculators succeed in deceiving group 2 by using ˜ x¤
A1 as their switching private
signal: it becomes more likely for the currency peg in country B to be abandoned
since speculators in group 2 believe specualtors in group 1 were bull. It means the
expected utility in period 2 would increase. As long as the increase in the expected
utility in period 2 is greater than or equal to the cost ¹, deceiving seems to be the
equilibrium. But actually it cannot be the equilibrium. To see this, suppose the
increase in the expected utility in period 2 is greater than the cost ¹. In this case,
a chicken speculator has an incentive to refrain from attacking the peg in period A
when she observes ˜ x¤
A, provided that every other chicken speculator attacks. This
is because she can save the cost ¹ by refraining from attacking, without changing
the switching economic fundamentals in country A.18 Even if she does not pay the
deceiving cost, she can enjoy the increase in the expected utility in period 2 because
of other chicken speculators’ deceiving behavior. Put another way, she can free-
ride on other chicken speculators’ deceiving behavior. It in turn implies no chicken
speculator has an incentive to pay the cost. Therefore, deceiving cannot be the
equilibrium. In other words, there is no switching private signal other than those in
Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 in the two-stage game. I have proven the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 (Unique Sub-Game Perfect Equilibrium)
The unique sub-game perfect switching strategy equilibrium consists of the switching
private signals and the switching economic fundamentals as follows.
(i) In period 1, every speculator and the government follows the switching strategy
in Proposition 2.
18Since there is a continuum of speculators, an individual speculator cannot aﬀect the switching
economic fundamentals by herself alone.
21(ii) In period 2, every speculator and the government follows the switching strategy
in Proposition 3.
Now, I have shown the existence of contagion as the sub-game perfect equilib-
rium.
Proposition 5 (Contagion)
There exists contagion from country A to country B even if there is no economic
fundamentals linkage or the common lender either: for any µA 2 [˜ µ¤¤
A ; ˜ µ¤
A], ˜ µB(YA =
0) < ˜ µB(YA = 1).
3 Empirical Implication
I have identiﬁed the new channel of contagion theoretically. The question arises as
to how to measure it: what observable variables can we look at to check whether the
new channel indeed works in recent contagious currency crises? Put another way,
what is the unique prediction of the new channel that is observable in data?
The empirical literature on contagion has tried to construct an index of contagion
to capture the speciﬁc channel: the trade linkage index, the capital linkage index,
the geographical distance index, and so on. How should one construct an index to
capture the channel of this paper? The index has to enable us to distinguish the
channel proposed in this paper from other contagion channels. In reality, it is hard to
estimate the type of speculators directly from data. But noting the diﬀerence of the
empirical implication between the existing literature and this paper, I can construct
an index to capture the unique implication of the channel proposed in this paper.
The index will be constructed so as to contradict the common implication of the
existing literature but ﬁt only the one of this paper. Therefore I can estimate the
contents of this paper at least indirectly. The key diﬀerence of the implication comes
from the following Proposition.
Proposition 6 (Crisis with Better Economic Fundamentals Are More Con-
tagious)
Pick any µ0
A · ˜ µ¤¤
A and µ00
A 2 [˜ µ¤¤
A ; ˜ µ¤
A]. The currency crisis in country A with bet-
ter economic fundamentals µ00
A is more contagious than that with worse economic
fundamentals µ0
A. That is, µ¤¤
B < µ¤
B where µ¤¤
B is the switching value of economic
fundamentals conditional on country A’s crisis for µ0
A while µ¤
B is the switching value
of economic fundamentals conditional on country A’s crisis for µ00
A.
The intuition for this result is simple. For any µ0
A · ˜ µ¤¤
A , the currency peg would
be abandoned irrespective of the type of group 1. Thus the currency crisis would
convey no information about the type, which would not cause contagion. In other
words, economic fundamentals in country A are so bad that no speculator would
be surprised at the crisis, which means no speculator would change the behavior.
But for any µ00
A 2 [˜ µ¤¤
A ; ˜ µ¤
A], the currency crisis would occur in country A if and only
if speculators in group 1 are bull. Thus whether or not the crisis has happened in
22country A does convey information about the type of group 1, which is the source of
contagion. For any µ00
A 2 [˜ µ¤¤
A ; ˜ µ¤
A], economic fundamentals in country A are not so bad
in that the currency crisis would not have happened if speculators in group 1 were
chicken. Thus the currency crisis would surprise speculators in group 2 in this case,
which make them change the behavior so as to cause the contagion. Put another way,
if the currency crisis happens where economic fundamentals are considered to be not
so bad or seemingly good, it will lead to a big surprise and thereby the crisis could
hit even unrelated counties. This is exactly the recent experience of the contagious
crises we have seen. So far, such contagion across unrelated countries that is not due
to capital linkage has been explained just as an international panic or treated as a
puzzle.19 But this paper provides an explanation for why such contagion happens.
The common implication in the literature is that the worse economic fundamen-
tals in the originating crisis country (country A) are, the more contagious the crisis
is. This is because the literature has been exploring the transmission mechanism
through which the negative eﬀect of bad economic fundamentals of the originating
crisis country would spread directly or indirectly. If countries are related in terms of
economic fundamentals such as trade linkage, the negative eﬀect of the crisis would
hit them directly. If there are capital linkage through the common lender or the
interbank market, the negative eﬀect of the crisis would hit the common lender or
the interbank market ﬁrst and then would be transmitted to countries through cap-
ital linkage indirectly. In each case, the worse economic fundamentals of country A
are, the larger the negative eﬀect of the originating crisis is. The larger the negative
eﬀect of the originating crisis is, the more severe countries would be aﬀected. This
is the logic behind the common implication above. But Proposition 6 shows the
opposite can be true. If the currency crisis happens where economic fundamentals
are considered to be not so bad or seemingly good, it will lead to a big surprise and
hence the crisis could hit even unrelated counties sometimes. It implies that even if
country B could get rid of the contagion of the crisis, it does not necessarily mean
that it will not be vulnerable to contagion of crises that happens in the country with
better economic fundamentals than country A. This seems counterintuitive, but it
is reasonable in fact. If the currency crisis happens in the country whose economic
fundamentals are good, everybody will be surprised, which can make the crisis more
19We could construct a model in which the common lender is the contagion channel to show
similar result as Proposition 6. Suppose the international bank, as the common lender, has made
huge loans to country A and has been too optimistic to set aside enough loan loss reserves because
economic fundamentals in country A have been considered to be good ex ante. If the unexpected
currency crisis happens, the international bank with huge loans is hit so severe since it does not
have enough loan loss reserves. Then it may call in its loans from other unrelated countries to meet
the required capital ratio, resulting in contagion. This scenario seems to lead to the conclusion
exactly same as Proposition 6. But it is diﬀerent in fact. To see the diﬀerence, ﬁrst note that
the worse economic fundamentals ex post are, the more non-performing loans there are. As a
result, the worse economic fundamentals ex post are, the more contagious the crisis is. However,
Proposition 6 states that the better economic fundamentals ex post are, the more contagious the
crisis is. Thus they are diﬀerent critically. Moreover, Proposition 6 is derived without the common
lender.
23contagious.
It should be noted that the negative eﬀect of the originating crisis itself does
not matter in the contagion channel of this paper. Since economic fundamentals are
independent between country A and country B, there cannot be direct transmission
of the negative eﬀect from country A to country B. Since no speculator incurs
losses in the crisis and there is no capital linkage, the negative eﬀect would never
spread from country A to country B even indirectly. In sum, the negative eﬀect of
bad economic fundamentals of country A itself is not transmitted to country B in
contagion of this model. What matters in this model is that the crisis in country A
can convey speculators’ type.
In spite of the diﬀerence of the implication between the existing literature and
this paper, all the channels of contagion including the one proposed in this paper,
are not exclusive to each other. Actually they can work at the same time. So
they are complementary in that the contagious eﬀect of the currency crisis will be
ampliﬁed when several channels work simultaneously. Therefore it is worthwhile to
investigate the interactive eﬀects of multiple channels.
Moreover, there is an important implication about the timing of ﬁnancial crisis
in the theoretical models of Morris and Shin (1998) that has as yet to be taken
into account in empirical papers: that signals (regressors) are noisy may matter in
determining the timing of ﬁnancial crises. The key role of noisy signals is in their
importance in getting rid of self-fulﬁlling property of ﬁnancial crisis and thereby
holding out the prospect of pinning down the timing of these crises. In other words,
measurement error of regressors is important in estimating the timing of ﬁnancial
crises. To the best of my knowledge, all the empirical research of ﬁnancial crises
assumes no measurement error of regressors. Thus I would like to pursue this issue
in future research.
4 Conclusion
A possible extension of the model presented in this paper is to consider the role of
a single large speculator who can aﬀect the whole market to some degree. In this
paper, none of the speculators can aﬀect the market as a whole by herself. But recent
currency crises episodes suggest that large traders, like George Soros, can exercise
a disproportionate inﬂuence on the likelihood and severity of a ﬁnancial crisis by
fermenting and orchestrating attacks against weakened currency pegs. Corsetti,
Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004) argue that the presence of the large speculator
does make all other traders more aggressive in their selling. But they do not consider
the implication of the presence of the large speculator for contagion. The implication
for contagion is not so obvious. On the one hand, the currency crisis may be more
contagious in the the presence of the large speculator, simply because the large
speculator has larger market power in attacking the currency peg of country B than
she does in the model presented in this paper. But on the other hand, the currency
crisis may be less contagious because the type revealing eﬀect, which is critical to
24the contagion channel in this paper, may become small if all other traders become
more aggressive in attacking the currency peg of country A. It is not so diﬃcult to
incorporate the large speculator into the model presented in this paper. Therefore
I will be working on this issue in another paper.20
20See Taketa (2003).
25Success Failure
Roll Over D 0
Not Roll Over t + ¹1 t + ¹1
Table 2: Payoﬀ Matrix
Appendix
A A Rolling Over Game among Foreign Creditors
The contagion channel in this paper can work with other channels at the same time.
Here I show it can work with the common lender. In particular, I show the model
in this paper can describe a roll-over game among common lenders.
Just rename speculators in the model as foreign creditors. Foreign creditors have
invested both in country A and in country B. They have ﬁnanced a project in each
country. So they are the common lenders. Observing the private signal, a creditor
decides whether she rolls over her loan or not. If she decides not to roll over and
asks to liquidate, her payoﬀ is t = ¹1 for sure. Not to roll over is a safe choice,
which corresponds to refraining from attacking the peg in the model. If she decides
to roll over, her payoﬀ depends on two factors - the economic fundamentals µj and
the degree of disruption caused to the project by the early liquidation by creditors.
The latter is measured by the proportion of creditors who do not roll over, lj. The
project yields the payoﬀ D (i.e., roll over is successful) if µj ¸ lj and zero (i.e., roll
over fails) if µj < lj. That is, if a suﬃcient proportion of creditors refuses to roll over
relative to the economic fundamentals (µj < lj), the project is liquidated entirely
and yields nothing.21 Roll over is a risky choice in that the payoﬀ is uncertain,
which corresponds to attacking the peg in the model. Notice the similarity of the
payoﬀ structure between the speculators game and the creditors game (see Table
1 and Table 2). Indeed, all the reasoning of the speculators game applies to the
creditors game: the switching strategy equilibrium arises and contagion exists due
to the learning the type of creditors of group 1. If creditors in group 1 are chicken
and µA 2 [˜ µ¤¤
A ; ˜ µ¤
A], the suﬃcient proportion of creditors refuses to roll over so that
the project would die in country A (i.e., the ﬁnancial crisis in country A). Observing
that, creditors in group 2 learns the type of creditors in group 1 and thereby change
the switching signal for country B, resulting in contagion from country A to country
B.22
In terms of deriving the equilibrium, the speculators game and the creditors
game are exactly the same. Thus we can derive similar Propositions in the creditors
game as in the speculators game. A diﬀerence is that the crisis is beneﬁcial for
21This formulation is similar as Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
22Obviously, contagion becomes more severe if economic fundamentals are correlated (i.e.,
Cov(µA;µB) > 0).
26speculators while no-crisis (successful roll over) is beneﬁcial for creditors. Another
diﬀerence is that bull speculators play a central role in contagion in the speculators
game while chicken creditors play a central role in contagion in the creditors game.
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